Intergenerational Rights Without Democracy: A Tailored Rights Framework

Democratic governance systems represent only living, enfranchised voters. This structural feature, not a failure of democratic practice but a consequence of its design, produces a systematic bias toward present consumption and against the welfare of future generations. The existing literature diagnoses this problem but proposes solutions that remain structurally dependent on the same democratic will they identify as deficient. This paper introduces the Tailored Rights Framework (TRF), derived analytically from the Islamic juristic tradition as an institutional alternative that embeds intergenerational rights into the structural architecture of governance.

The TRF rests on three interlocking mechanisms whose institutional logic is independently documented in non-Islamic legal traditions: universal land-revival rights, permanent common-access resource governance, and structurally embedded redistributive obligation. These mechanisms function as institutional ḥarakiyyāt, mechanics that operate regardless of the cultural or religious identity of the society that adopts them.

The paper argues that the future-generations problem is not solvable from within democratic theory alone; it requires a framework in which certain rights are constitutionally prior to political will. The paper concludes by proposing a minimal institutional blueprint applicable to any constitutional order. –SSRN